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Deficiency Payments and Market Power: Effects of Imperfect 






Abstract: Despite the increasing importance of market power in the food industry, most 
policy models assume perfect competition. Ignoring market power may lead economists to 
make incorrect, or at least misleading, policy recommendations. In this paper I develop a 
theoretical model in which market power can alter conclusions regarding the welfare effects 
of a specific policy change: replacing deficiency payments with decoupled payments to 
farmers, and apply it to the U.S. wheat market and milling industry.  The main conclusions 
of the theoretical model are that, middlemen’s market power may cause i) an increase in 
public expenditure, ii) an extraction of policy rents from the taxpayers by the middlemen, 
and iii) a reduction of the social benefit from decoupling deficiency payments.  
I develop an econometric model to investigate if the U.S. wheat milling industry is gaining 
a rent from the federal loan deficiency payment program, using its market power. The 
results suggest that the wheat milling industry exhibit a moderate degree of oligopsony 
power and no oligopoly power. Due to the inelastic demand and supply, even a low level of 
market  power  has  relevant  effects.  In  the  average  year,  the  per-unit  increase  of  public 
expenditure for the deficiency payments reaches 14.5% of the wheat price, and the potential 
benefits from removing the policy are reduced by 21.3%.  
 
JEL codes: Q18, L13 
 
Keywords: Decoupling, Deficiency Payments, Market Power 
   3 
Introduction 
 
Despite  the  increasing  importance  of  market  power  in  the  food  industry,  most  policy 
models  assume  perfect  competition,  especially  if  a  general  equilibrium  approach  is 
followed (Rude and Meilke, 2004). Ignoring market power may lead economists to make 
incorrect or misleading policy recommendations. Since imperfect competition may affect 
the industry equilibrium significantly, it should be carefully considered in policy analysis 
(Bucirossi,  et  al.,  2002,  McCorriston,  2002,  Sexton,  2000).  In  this  paper  I  develop  a 
theoretical model in which market power can alter conclusions regarding the welfare effects 
of a specific policy change: replacing deficiency payments with decoupled payments to 
farmers.  The  conventional  textbook  analysis  of  replacing  deficiency  payments  with 
decoupled support predicts that social welfare will increase, because farmers will reduce 
their  output  to  the  socially  optimal,  perfectly  competitive  level.  I  demonstrate  that  the 
presence of middleman market power, either oligopsony power in the farmgate market or 
oligopoly power in the output market, might reduce or eliminate this social benefit, or even 
result in a net social cost. 
I apply the model to the U.S. wheat market and milling industry. This application is 
particularly  relevant.  Decoupling  was  one  of  the  major  achievements  from  the  1994 
Uruguay round of GATT negotiations and further reduction of coupled measures is one of 
the major issues in the current Doha Round of WTO talks. Both price floors and deficiency 
payments  are  “amber  box”  measures  and  governments  are  expected  to  cut  them 
significantly in the next future. However, the model presented in the next sections suggests 
that,  in  presence  of  market  power,  decoupling  might  not  be  as  beneficial  as  expected.   4 
Moreover,  the  model  indicates  that  middleman  market  power  might  increase  public 
expenditures for any given level of farmer support.  Consequently, reducing market power 
in  the  middleman  market  can  reduce  public  expenditures  without  decreasing  farmer 
support. 
The Theoretical Framework 
A  deficiency  payment  scheme  consists  of  direct  government  payments  to  farmers  who 
participated in an annual program. The payment rate is based on the difference between an 
established target price and average market price for the commodity. The total payment to 
the farmer is calculated multiplying the payment rate and, the farm's eligible production. As 
a consequence, a farmer participating to the program receives a price for his product that is 
always at least equal to the target price (e. g., Wallace, 1962).  
Deficiency payments have been one of the cornerstones of U.S. agricultural policy 
in the wheat, feed grain, rice and cotton sectors. Over the years, the policy governing this 
program has been reformed several times, creating a complex set of regulations. In my 
analysis, I will focus on the simple definition provided in the previous paragraph, ignoring 
the features of the actual U.S. program. In particular, I will ignore the difference between 
the Deficiency Payment Program (abolished in 1996) and the Loan Deficiency Payments 
(LDP), currently in use. I will also assume that all farmers participate in the program and all 
cropland is eligible acreage. These restrictive assumptions allow me to develop a simple 
model, and are consistent with previous literature (e. g., Alston and James, 2001) 
  In the model, I describe the interaction across three groups of agents: consumers, 
farmers and processors (the millers). Consumers and producers behave competitively, while   5 
processors (acting as middlemen) may have oligopsony and/or oligopoly power. I assume 
that the processors use a fixed-proportions, constant-returns-to-scale technology.  There is 
no  uncertainty,  no  international  trade  and  all  agents  have  perfect  information.  These 
restrictive  assumptions  allow  me  to  address  the  problem  in  the  simplest  possible  way, 
focusing the analysis only on the interaction between policy and market power.  
  The main conclusion of the model is that, middlemen’s market power may cause i) 
an increase in public expenditure, ii) an extraction of policy rents from the taxpayers by the 
middlemen, and iii) a reduction of the social benefit from decoupling support payments.  
   In  the  presence  of  a  deficiency  payment  program,  the  production  exceeds  the 
output level in the non-subsidized market, and the final consumer price falls in order to 
ensure  that  the  procurement  and  final  product  markets  clear.  Since  in  this  framework 
output is determined by the level of the target price, supply is perfectly inelastic with 
respect to the market price obtained by farmers. Thus, the farm price in the presence of 
both buyer oligopsony power and a producer target price is not uniquely determined and, 
instead, depends upon the relative bargaining power of farmers and middlemen. If the farm 
price  is  expected  to  be  below  the  target  price,  then  producers’  incentives  to  bargain 
aggressively are attenuated because, regardless of the bargained price, their final price is 
set by the target. In these settings the market farm price may fall considerably below the 
target, and the government expenditure necessary to sustain the target price may be much 
higher  than  would  be  necessary  with  a  perfectly  competitive  procurement  market.  By 
lowering the price in the procurement market, the middlemen are able to appropriate part 
of the benefit from the policy. In fact, the difference between the consumer price and the 
procurement market price can be considered a per-unit transfer from the taxpayers to the   6 
middlemen. In this case, part of the expenditure for a measure designed to support farmers 
is actually subsidizing the processors. 
Figure 1: Market Equilibrium under Deficiency Payment Scheme and Market Power 
 
 
  Figure  1  illustrates  the  model  describing  the  effects  of  imposing  a  deficiency 
payment scheme with an exogenously determined target price (TP) and processors holding 
oligopsony and oligopoly power. In absence of this policy, the equilibrium quantity (QM) 
is determined by the intersection of the perceived marginal factor cost curve (PMFC) and 
the perceived marginal revenue (PMR) curve (Sexton and Zhang, 2001). From the inverse   7 
demand and supply curve, the equilibrium prices in the procurement and final markets are 
PfM and PrM, respectively. The deadweight loss from market power with respect to the 
perfectly competitive equilibrium is the shaded area A. 
If the regulator imposes a target price LR, the output increases from QM to QD. In 
order to clear the market, the price in the final market must fall to Pr. Conjectural variation 
theory cannot determine the price in the procurement market, but the expectation is that it 
falls between zero the value of the marginal unit sold in the final market (the value V in 
Figure 1). The actual price is determined by the relative bargaining power of farmers and 
processors. However, since the farmers have little incentive to bargain, the price decrease 
and  the  consequent  increase  in  public  expenditure  can  be  severe.  This  additional 
expenditure can be considered as a transfer from the taxpayers to the processors and does 
not affect the total social welfare, if the opportunity cost of taxation is equal to the amount 
of the transfer. In this case, the deadweight loss from the policy with respect to the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium is the shaded area B.  
  The theoretical model shows that, in presence of market power, the usual textbook 
conclusions about deficiency payments may not hold. The analysis suggests that the gain 
from decoupling may be lower than under perfect competition. In fact, the policy measure 
may be welfare enhancing, if the loan rate is set between the unregulated farm price and the 
perfect competition. Also, the processors may capture part of the payments by lowering the 
farm price, so that part of the policy expenditure does not provide any benefit to farmers.  
The magnitude of the impact of market power on the policy outcome is, of course, an 
empirical question. In the next section I provide an illustrative estimation using the U.S. 
wheat market as a case study.   8 
Empirical Application: Who is the U.S. Supporting in the Wheat Market? 
The theoretical model concluded that processors holding market power might capture part 
of the surplus from a deficiency payment policy by lowering prices in the procurement 
market. In this section I develop an econometric model to investigate if the wheat milling 
industry used deficiency payments as an opportunity to gain profits. If this is the case, then 
a policy measure that is supposed to benefit farmers is actually in part subsidizing the 
milling industry. Moreover, the US could reduce its policy expenditure by preventing the 
exertion of market power, benefiting the public budget and strengthening its position in 
trade negotiations. In fact the U.S. could reduce the expenditure for an amber box measure 
without decreasing the support received by farmers. 
The existence of market power in the wheat milling industry is a hotly debated topic, 
motivated by the industry’s high level of concentration. One of the largest firms (Archer 
Daniels  Midland)  was  implicated  in  a  price-fixing  case  in  the  U.S.  lysine  market, 
suggesting  that  the  industry  may  be  willing  to  collude  as  sellers,  exercising  oligopoly 
power.  In  1999,  the  U.S.  Department  of  Justice  filed  a  complaint  against  Cargill’s 
acquisition  of  Continental  Grain,  claiming  that  the  merger  would  substantially  lessen 
competition  for  grain  purchasing  services  to  farmers,  due  to  the  increased  capacity  to 
exercise oligopsony power.  
Econometric studies on the topic have given conflicting answers. Brester and Goodwin 
found that the degree of cointegration of the price time series across markets and across the 
vertical wheat chain was negatively correlated with the CR4 index, and argued that the 
increase in concentration was lessening competition. However the authors noticed that “the   9 
price series remain highly cointegrated”, supporting the notion that the industry might be in 
fact  still  competitive  (Brester  and  Goodwin,  1993).  Kim  et  al.  (2001)  used  a  Poisson 
regression model to investigate the change in the industry structure and found evidence of 
oligopoly with price leadership. Stiegert tested for upstream and downstream market power 
in  the  US  hard  wheat  milling  industry  and  found  that  the  null  hypothesis  of  perfect 
competition could not be rejected (Stiegert, 2002). 
Previous  studies  have  mostly  ignored  government  intervention  and  as,  a  result,  the 
representation  of  the  industry  behavior  might  be  biased.  In  fact,  the  theoretical  model 
suggests that, in presence of oligopsony power, changes in the policy regime may trigger 
changes in the pricing strategies of the milling industry. In this case, econometric models 
not accounting for the change in the regime might fail to detect market power. Thus, the 
main contribution of my estimation of market power in the wheat milling industry is that I 
explicitly account for the effect of agricultural policy. 
Since my goal is to provide an illustration of the theoretical framework, I impose in the 
estimation the same assumption that I maintained in the model. These restrictions introduce 
the possibility of model specification bias, which may be severe. As a consequence, the 
empirical analysis should be considered just as an illustrative example of the theoretical 
model, rather than a definitive study precisely replicating the demand, supply and structure 
of marginal costs in the milling industry. In particular, the assumptions of linear demand 
and supply and constant marginal costs may drive the results.   10 
The estimation strategy. 
The objective of the analysis is to measure the increase in public expenditure (if any) for a 
deficiency payment program due to milling industry market power. Figure 2 illustrates the 
point: our objective is to measure the vertical distance between Pr  (the price of the wheat 
flour under the policy regime minus the millers’ marginal cost) and Pr (the farmer price of 
wheat under the policy regime). If the milling industry uses marginal cost pricing, then this 
difference  should  be  zero.  In  addition,  it  is  possible  to  break  down  the  increase  in 
government expenditure into two components: the oligopoly effect (the distance between Pr 
and V) and the oligopsony effect (the distance between V and Pf). This distinction may have 
relevant policy implications, since the measures to deal with the two types of market power 
may be different. 
I  address  the  problem  using  two  different  methodologies.  First  I  test  for  the 
existence of market power using a non-parametric approach. This step allows me to assess 
the presence of milling industry market power without imposing any assumption about the 
functional  form  of the  processing  industry  marginal  cost  or about  the  economic  model 
describing  the  industry  behavior.  Given  the  mixed  results  from  the  literature,  this  test 
allows for a first general result. In fact, the theoretical model concludes that the existence of 
market power always implies an increase of public expenditure for the deficiency payment 
program. The limitation of this approach is that it does offer a measure the extent of the 
market power.  
   11 
Figure 2: Deficiency Payment Scheme under Milling Industry’s Market Power 
 
 
The  second  approach  follows  the  standard  methodology  of  imposing  a  specific 
structure on demand and supply, and estimating market power as a “conjectural variation” 
on the [0,1] interval (Appelbaum, 1982, Bresnahan, 1989, Genesove and Mullins, 1998). 
The estimation imposes a specific structure to the data assuming linear demand and supply, 
constant marginal cost milling technology and a static framework. The results from this 
model  assess  the  extent  of  oligopoly  and  oligopsony  power,  at  the  expenses  of  more 
restrictive assumptions. Given the relevance of Corts’ critique of the conjectural variation 
methods, the non-parametric approach may be used to validate the results of the parametric 
estimation (Corts, 1999).   12 
The data. 
The analysis is based on the 1974-2005 time series of the prices of wheat and wheat flour in 
the Kansas City and Minneapolis wheat markets that are published in the USDA Wheat 
Yearbook. The data series report the price of wheat flour and byproducts and the cost of 
wheat to produce 100 lbs of flour. Thus, the data are immediately comparable, because they 
represents  the  total  revenues  from  the  production  of  100  lbs.  of  wheat  flour  and  the 
corresponding costs for the farm input.  Figure 3 illustrates the data and Table 1 reports the 
key descriptive statistics for the Kansas City and Minneapolis time series of real prices of 
wheat, wheat products and of the price difference (defined as the difference between the 
price of 100 lbs. of flour and the price for the equivalent quantity of wheat). Data have been 
deflated using the producer price index with base 1982 provided by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
 
Figure 3: 1974-2005 Real Prices of Wheat and Wheat Products in Kansas City and Minneapolis ($/100 lbs of 
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The  data  in  Table  1  show  that  the  average  prices  in  Minneapolis  are  higher, 
although the difference with respect to the Kansas City market is not statistically significant 
at the 90% confidence level. The real price differences are similar in the two markets: the 
average was equal to 2.14 dollars per 100 lbs of flour in Minneapolis and 2.11 dollars in 
Kansas City.  In 1993, USDA reported in Kansas City an unusually high relative price of 
wheat: the value was higher that the flour price and close to the total wheat product price. 
Since the time series from Minneapolis do not show the same shock, I considered this 
observation an outlier and corrected by using mean imputation for both the wheat and the 
wheat product prices. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the 1974-2005. Time Series of  Real Prices of Wheat, Wheat Products and 
Price Difference (data are expressed in $/100 lbs. of flour, deflated using a Producer Price Index base 1982) 
   Wheat Price  Wheat Products Price  Price Difference 
   Minneapolis  Kansas City  Minneapolis  Kansas City  Minneapolis  Kansas City 
Mean  9.30  8.87  11.44  10.98  2.14  2.11 
Std. Error of Mean  0.28  0.27  0.29  0.25  0.09  0.04 
Median  9.04  8.67  11.02  10.71  2.03  2.11 
Sample Std. Dev.  1.57  1.51  1.64  1.43  0.49  0.24 
N. Observations  32  32  32  32  32  32 
Source: USDA Wheat Yearbook 2006 
   14 
As expected, there is evidence of a strong link between the two markets. A Dickey-
Fuller cointegration test allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration both for 
the  wheat  prices  and  the  wheat  product  prices  at  90%  confidence  level.  The  analysis 
confirm the results by Brester and Goodwin (1993) showing a strong link between the two 
markets. As a consequence it is possible to pool the two data series using a panel data 
approach, in order to gain efficiency in the estimation. In particular, I will assume the 
existence of a fixed effect across the two data series. Since in this case the number of 
individuals is low compared to the number of time periods (two compared to 32), I model 
the fixed effect using a dummy variable identifying the data from the Kansas City market. I 
used the Kansas City data only to calibrate the model, so that the pooled analysis should be 
immune from pre-test bias. 
 
The Non-Parametric Approach 
In this section I use a non-parametric regression model to assess the existence of market 
power in the wheat milling industry. The test is based on a two-step procedure. In the first 
step I regress the price difference (defined as the difference between the price of flour and 
the price of wheat) on a set of variables X that describes the milling industry marginal cost 
and I obtain a vector of residuals u. In the second step I test for any systematic component 
in the residuals using as regressors a set of variables Z that, according to the theoretical 
model, might be correlated with the mark-up from the milling industry market power. If 
there the market is competitive, the residuals u should be just white noise and should be 
uncorrelated with Z.    15 
Note  that  this  test  requires  that  the  variables  Z  must  be  uncorrelated  with  any 
omitted variable in the first stage regression. The requirement is less restrictive than the 
fundamental assumption of parametric models, which usually require that the marginal cost 
function is correctly specified. This implies that the test is robust with respect to other 
forms  of  deviation  from  marginal  cost  pricing  than  market  power  (such  as  capacity 
constraints, imperfect information, etc.) that are not explicitly modeled in the first stage 
regression as long the variables Z are uncorrelated with these omitted determinants. 
The choice of the variables Z is critical for the interpretation of the test. In order to 
infer  the  existence  of  market  power,  it  is  necessary  to  use  a  set  of  regressors  that  is 
associated with industry market power but it is independent from millers’ marginal cost or 
any  deviation  from  the  marginal  cost-pricing  rule  due  to  other  causes.  The  theoretical 
model  suggests  that,  if  the  milling  industry  has  no  market  power,  the  price  difference 
should be equal to the marginal cost and should be independent from the policy regime. 
Then I will use as auxiliary regressor matrix Z variables that describe the public support at 
any  given  time  period.  The  choice  is  based  on two  assumptions:  i)  the  level  of  public 
support for farmers does not affect the millers’ marginal cost and ii) the policy variables are 
exogenous, i.e., the regulator set the support price independently from the price difference 
(but can be dependent on the absolute level of the farm prices).  
Table 2 summarizes the variables utilized in the X matrix, defining the determinants 
of the milling industry marginal costs, and in the Z matrix, containing the variables for 
market power detection. The primary regression describes the milling industry marginal 
cost  as  an  unknown  function  of  input  prices,  quantity  produced  and  the  fixed  effect 
summarizing the differences between the Kansas City and the Minneapolis markets. The   16 
quantity produced is approximated using total US flour production, rather than the quantity 
traded in each of the two markets, which was not available. In order to avoid the curse of 
dimensionality,  I  summarized  the  prices  of  the  milling  industry  input  factors  using  a 
principal component analysis of a matrix composed of transportation costs (the real retail 
price of unleaded gas), labor costs (the real hourly wage for manufacturing sector) and a 
time  trend.  Since  the  variables  are  strongly  correlated,  the  first  component  alone 
summarizes the 99% of the total variance.  Thus, the X matrix, identifying the determinants 
of the industry marginal costs, is composed of three variables: the first component of the 
input price matrix (V), the flour quantity (QF) and a fixed effect dummy variable (K), 
identifying the Kansas City market.  
Table 2: The Structure of the Two-Step Non Parametric Test 









Price Difference   First Component of  Residual from   Constant (C) 
  the input price 
matrix (V)  
Primary Regression 
u = y – E(y|X) 
Dummy for Binding 
Policy Regimes (BIN) 
  Dummy for Fixed 
Effect (K) 
  Support Price (SP) 
  Quantity (QF)    Interaction term 
(SP*BIN) 
      Income (RINC)   17 
 
 
The secondary regression tests for the existence of market power by checking the 
correlation between Z and u. Given the theoretical model, I use policy related variables as 
regressors in order to verify if there is any systematic component in the error term from the 
primary regression. I summarized the policy in three variables: i) the support price (SP), 
defined as the highest price rate from the coupled policy measures, ii) a binary variable 
(BIN) which is equal one if the policy is binding and zero otherwise and iii) an interaction 
term calculated as the product of the SP and BIN. Following the theoretical model I assume 
that the policy is binding if the support price of the coupled measures is higher than the 
market price. 
If the policy variables are jointly significant, there is empirical evidence that the 
data  generating  process  changes  when  the  deficiency  payment  program  is  in  effect.  I 
interpret this result as evidence of millers’ oligopsony power, given the conclusions of the 
theoretical model. As shown in Figure 2, if the millers hold oligopsony power then the 
policy regime affects the determination of the price difference. If the policy is not binding 
the price difference is determined by the intersection of the perceived marginal revenue 
curve  (PMR)  and  the  perceived  marginal  factor  cost  curve  (PMFC).  Under  the  policy 
regime, the price difference is determined by the relative bargaining power of farmers and 
millers. The test on the policy variables captures this change in the data generating process.  
I used a demand shifter in the auxiliary regression (annual U.S. real income) to test 
if  shocks  in  demand  affect  the  price  difference,  suggesting  the  possibility  of  oligopoly 
power. If a t-test on the parameter of the demand shifter rejects the null hypothesis, there is   18 
evidence supporting the presence of oligopoly power. Failure to reject the null hypothesis is 
not a conclusive answer, because the result is consistent with two cases: either the industry 
has no oligopoly power or the derivative of the inverse demand is not affected by the 
demand shifter (i.e., the shifter affects the intercept and not the slope of the curve).   
 







I estimated the primary regression using a Nadaraya-Watson non-parametric kernel 
estimator  and  a  Silverman  bandwidth.  Figure  4  show  the  fit  of  the  non-parametric 
regression for the two markets. The R
2 for the pooled regression is 0.48 but the adjusted R
2 
drops to 0.28. 
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The existence of market power can be tested by regressing the residuals from the 
primary regression on the matrix Z of policy variables. I performed this step via OLS, using 
White’s robust standard errors. In this way, I can test for correlation between Z and u by 
using a F-test on the joint significance of  the explanatory variables. 
Table 3 reports the results from the auxiliary regression. Since the F-test on the joint 
significance  of  all  the  explanatory  variables  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis  at  99% 
confidence level, there is a statistical evidence of a systematic component in the residuals 
from  the  primary  regression.  This  result  implies  that  the  marginal  cost  alone  does  not 
explain the price difference entirely. Given the theoretical model, it is possible to interpret 
this result as an indication of milling industry market power.  




2 = 0.232  F-Stat   = 3.565 
(p-value = 0.007) 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  P-Value 
Dummy for Binding Policy (BIN)   -1.370  0.445  0.003 
Support Price (SP)  -0.035  0.105  0.742 
Interaction Term (SP⋅BIN)  0.392  0.005  0.005 
Real Income (RINC)  0.023  0.016  0.159 
Constant  -0.080  0.336  0.813 
  
An F-test testing the joint significance of the three policy variables (SP, BIN and the 
interaction  term)  provided an  F-statistic  of  5.906,  rejecting the  null  hypothesis that the 
coefficients are jointly equal to zero at 99.5% confidence level. The result supports the   20 
conclusion that the milling industry holds oligopsony power. The coefficient of the real 
income  variable  (RINC)  is  not  significantly  different  from  zero,  and  the  test  does  not 
support any final conclusion about the presence of oligopoly power.  
    The  non-parametric  approach  suggests  that  the  wheat  milling  industry  exerts 
oligopsony  power.  This  conclusion  is  particularly  relevant  since  under  oligopsony  the 
increase  in  public  expenditure  for  deficiency  payments  due  to  market  power  might  be 
severe. In the next section, I use a parametric approach to get an estimate of market power, 
at  the  cost  of  more  restrictive  assumptions.  Since  the  non-parametric  model  does  not 
exclude  the  presence  of  oligopoly  power,  the  parametric  model  will  test  for  the 
simultaneous presence of the two kinds of market power. 
 
The parametric approach 
The  parametric  estimation  is  based  on  a  system  of  three  equations  describing 
supply,  demand  and  the  price  difference.  The  model  follows  the  standard  conjectural 
variation  approach,  in  which  demand and  supply  are  estimated  in  order to  provide  the 
parameters  necessary  for  the  identification  of  market  power  (Bresnahan,  1989).  The 
measurement of market power is based on the assumption of constant marginal costs of the 
milling industry. Under this key assumption, in a perfectly competitive market the price 
difference  should  not  depend  on  quantity.  Then,  if  we  regress  the  price  difference  on 
quantity and we find it statistically significant we can argue that the industry holds market 
power. The literature developed tests for market power with more flexible marginal cost   21 
functions (e. g., Azzam, 1997). The assumption of constant marginal cost was imposed for 
consistency with the theoretical model and in order to simplify the analysis.  
The  supply  equation  is  modeled  as  a  linear  function  of  the  wheat  market  price 
(RWP), of the support price, in the years when the policy is binding, (SP⋅BIN) and the 
technology (represented by the time trend, T). The equation also includes a dummy variable 
identifying the years when the policy was binding (BIN), an interaction term with price 
(RWP⋅BIN) and a dummy variable identifying the years when the Farm Bill regulation was 
in place (FB). A change in the policy regime causes a shift of the intercept and a change in 
the supply slope with respect to the market price and the support prices. I will use this shift 
in supply slope to identify market power.  
The  demand  equation  is  a  linear  combination  of  the  wholesale  price  of  wheat 
products (RPP), the real U. S. income (RINC) and the marginal cost of the retail industry 
summarized by the cost of labor (RHW). Demand is assumed to be independent of the 
policy regime.  
The price difference equation regresses the wheat product price on the wheat price, 
the quantity of wheat flour (QF) and the first factor of the input price matrix (V). The 
equation includes also interaction terms allowing for a change in the slope and the intercept 
when the policy is binding. I restricted the wheat price coefficient to be equal to one, so that 
the relation describes the price difference.
2 
All  equations  include  a  dummy  variable  describing  the  differences  between  the 
Minneapolis and the Kansas City markets as a fixed effect. The sources of the data are the 
                                       
2 By using this restriction I do not need to introduce an additional endogenous variable (the price difference)   22 
USDA Wheat Yearbook, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Energy Information 
Administration. 
Table 4: The Result of the 3-Stage Least Square Estimation  
Supply  Demand  Price Difference 
(Equation R
2:
 0.892)  (Equation R





































































Time Trend (T)  0.006 
(0.000) 
    1
st Factor of Input 
Price Matrix (V) 
0.008 
(0.041) 








(the numbers in parenthesis are the coefficient p-values) 
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The  system  was  estimated  using  iterative  three  stages  least  squares,  in  order  to 
account for possible correlation across the error terms and for the endogeneity in prices and 
quantities. Convergence was achieved after 8 iterations. 
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation, showing that the estimated coefficients 
are consistent with the expectations from economic theory. Demand and supply are rigid: 
own price elasticities at mean points are -0.163 and 0.366, respectively. When the policy is 
binding, the supply slope with respect to market price is not statistically different from 
zero.
3 The result confirms that under the policy regime the supply is perfectly inelastic with 
respect to the market price. 
In the price difference equation, the coefficient of the variable V, the first factor of 
the input price matrix, is not significantly different from zero when the policy is binding.
4 
This result implies that the price difference under the policy regime does not vary with 
millers’ marginal costs. The dummy variables controlling for the existence of a fixed effect 
difference between prices in the two markets are jointly not significantly different from 
zero.
5  
                                       
3 An F-test failed to reject the null hypothesis of rigid supply when the policy is binding (the p-value was 
0.415) 
4 The p-value of the F-test on the null hypothesis of zero sum of the coefficients of the variables V and 
V*BIN is 0.328 
5 The p-value of the F-test of the null hypothesis stating that the three coefficients are jointly equal to zero is 
0.817   24 
I apply the standard approach of using a supply shifter, in this case the change in the 
policy regime, to identify market power using the following system of two equations (e.g., 
























 are, respectively, the slope coefficients of the inverse demand and 
supply , θ and ξ are the oligopoly and oligopsony power parameters, γQF and γQF*BIN  are the 
estimated coefficients of the variables QF and QF*BIN from the price difference equation. 














=  83.976,  
where the two values are the estimates of the inverse supply slope when the policy is not 
binding and under the policy regime, respectively.  The supply slope is negative under the 








=  199.414 
Thus, it is possible to recover the conduct parameters from the following two-equation, 
two-unknown system:   25 
199.414⋅θ+71.881⋅ξ = 4.073        if the policy is not binding 
199.414⋅θ-83.976⋅ξ = -4.605       if the policy is binding 
The solution is θ = 0.000 and ξ = 0.055.  
The  milling  industry  exerts  a  moderate  amount  of  oligopsony  power  and  no 
oligopoly power, confirming the findings of the non-parametric analysis. This result has 
been obtained under very restrictive assumptions regarding demand and marginal costs, and 
should be interpreted with caution. Given this caveat, these conduct parameters suggest that 
the public expenditure for the deficiency payments in the wheat market may be higher than 
under a perfectly competitive regime. Since demand and supply are inelastic, the effects of 
a moderate amount of market power on welfare and public expenditure may be large.  
 
Calculating the impact of market power on public expenditure and social welfare. 
The  results  reported  in Table 4  allow  us  to  calculate  the  increase  in  the  policy 
expenditure  due  to  the  milling  industry  market  power.  Under  the  assumption  that  the 
switching  between  the  policy  regimes  is  exogenously  determined,  the  increase  in  the 
expenditure  can  be  measured  by  estimating  the  increase  in  the  price  difference  due  to 
market power. The expected increase in the price difference under the policy regime is 
E(ΔPMt|Vt) = (γQF+γQF*BIN)*QFt + γBIN +γV*BIN*Vt 
where γX is the regression coefficient for the variable X. 
In 1987 (the year when the flour production was closest to the mean), the estimated 
increase in public expenditure due to oligopsony power was $1.38 per lbs/00 of wheat 
flour, or approximately  $0.48  per bushel of wheat. The value was approximately 14.5% of   26 
the wheat price.  In 1994, the increase was $0.44 per bushel of wheat and in 1999 it was 
$0.45, suggesting that the value is approximately constant over the years. 
The estimate shows that a moderate level of oligopsony power has a high impact on 
prices when the policy is binding. The result supports the idea that farmers may have low 
incentive to bargaining, under a deficiency payment scheme. 
  The benefit from decoupling can be estimated by comparing the deadweight loss 
from market power and from the policy, as shown in Figure 2. In the following calculations 
I will use 1987 as a representative year, because it is the year with a value of production 
closest to the mean.  
From Table 4, it is possible to estimate the demand and supply equations and the 
equilibrium quantity and price under a perfect competition regime. Given the value of the 
variables in 1987, we obtain the following equations: 
PD =  a + b⋅QD = 78.099 – 199.414⋅QD     inverse net demand 
PS = c + d⋅QS  = -12.499 + 71.881⋅QS     inverse supply 
where prices are expressed in dollars per 100 pounds of wheat flour and quantities are in 
billions of hundredweights of wheat flour. The milling industry marginal cost was deducted 
from the intercept of the inverse net demand. 
  From the inverse net demand and supply, it is possible to estimate the equilibria in 
the unregulated market (with oligopsony power) and under perfect competition (Sexton and 
Zhang, 2001). The equilibrium under the policy regime is observable. The deadweight loss   27 
with respect to the perfect competition regime can be calculated as the area of the triangles 
A and B in Figure 2. Table 5 reports the results of the estimations.
6 
Table 5: Equilibrium Prices, Quantity and Deadweight Loss for Three Market Regimes (year 1987) 







Quantity (QF)  
(billions of cwt) 
0.334  0.329  0.342 
Wheat Price (PF) 
($ per 100 lbs. of flour) 
11.506  11.150  9.528 
Net Wheat Product Price (PR) 
($ per 100 lbs. of flour) 
11.506  12.491  10.822 
Support Price (SP) 
($ per 100 lbs.) 
---  ---  12.847 
Deadweight loss ($)  ---  3,310,674  15,556,962 
 
 
  The  result  of  the  analysis  is  that  the  presence  of  market  power,  on  average,  is 
expected to reduce the benefit from eliminating deficiency payments by 3.3 million dollars, 
                                       
6 The difference between the net wheat product price and the wheat price in Table 5 is $1.293 per 100 lbs. of 
flour. The figure is different from the previously stated 1.380. This is because 1.380 is the expected value and 
1.293 is the observed value of the increase in price difference. The difference is the regression error term 
(which, in 1987, was -0.087)   28 
which is approximately equal to 21.3% of the total expected benefit. A moderate amount of 
market power causes a significant reduction in the social gain from liberalization. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The paper develops a simple model showing that middlemen holding market power may 
extract  a  rent  from  a  deficiency  payment  program,  causing  an  increase  in  public 
expenditure, and applies it to the U.S. wheat market. Middlemen market power may reduce 
the benefits of removing the policy. Since deficiency payments prevent middlemen from 
restricting the supply, in a regulated market farmer and consumers are protected from such 
strategic  behavior.  In  contrast,  in  an  unregulated  market  middlemen  are  free  to  create 
scarcity in order to increase their profits. In the presence of market power, the effects of 
decoupling on social welfare must be carefully evaluated. The regulator is called to choose 
the lesser of two evils: the policy distortion or the market power-induced deadweight loss.  
In this framework, the benefits of decoupling are an empirical question. My analysis 
of the U.S. wheat market concluded that the milling industry holds a moderate degree of 
oligopsony power. Due to inelastic demand and supply, the millers’ market power has a 
significant impact. On an average year, the milling industry was able to extract a rent from 
the policy approximately equal to 14.5% of the wheat price, and reduced the projected 
benefit of emoving the deficiency payments by 21.3%. Although these figures were derived 
under restrictive assumptions, the results support the conclusion that market power should 
be carefully considered in policy design.  
   29 
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